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Article 6

Which Medical Ethics for
the 21st Century?
by

Dianne N. Irving, M.A., Ph.D.

The autho r is professor of Philosophy and Medical Ethics at the Pontifical
Faculty, The Dominican House of Studies, Washington, D. C. She has also
taught at the De Sales School of Theology, the Catholic University of
America and Georgetown Unive rsity. The following was presented at the
Eighth Annual Rose Mass Brunch, March, 1999, sponsored by the John
Carroll Society.

Introduction
Everyday we read and hear about the constant onslaught of controversial
medi cal iss ues, e.g., euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide, test tube
babies, cloning and stem cell research, creating monsters in the lab, etc. - it
is all coming down very fast! Thi s is not just business as usual! Yes, we
will all have to make decisions about these and many other iss ues not even
imag ined yet in the 21 st century. But wh at will be the basis of our
decisions, of our choices? Perhaps it is time to stop and seriously
reconsider which medi cal ethics should be used as the basis of these
choices - while we still can! Thi s choice will be critical to the well-being
of each of us individuall y, as we ll as to the well-being of our society at
large. I cannot help but recall a favorite cauti on of St. Thomas
(paraphrased) : "A small error in th e beginning leads to a multitude of
errors at the end!" Indeed, the ethical theory we choose will be the starting
point for these complicated deci sions. As such it can cause us to reach
conclusions and perform actions that are harmful and destructive - or
those, which wil] enrich, fortify, and strengthen all of us. The choice, of
course, is yours.
Abstracting from all the possible academic ethical theories which will
be vy ing for your patronage, I wi ll focus narrowly instead on two theories
of medical ethics - secular bioethics and Roman Catholic medical ethics,
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pointing out briefl y what they are, comparing their conclusions about what
is ri ght or wrong, and indicating where they have already lead us. Frankly,
I am convinced that sec ular bioethics can only lead us - individually and
collectively - to profound destruction, and should in no way be confused
with Roman Catholic medical ethics. In fact, I would encourage Catholics
to stop using the term " bioethi cs" with reference to the Church's moral
posi tions . I want to end by touching briefly on how the John Carroll
Society itself embodies the very heart and soul of Roman Catholic medical
ethics - and as such serves as a working role model for the rest of us.
To beg in with, consider th at ideas do have consequences - especially
ideas abo ut ethics when they are applied. Fundamentally different ethics
lead to fundamentally differe nt conclusions about what is right or wrong.
Nowhere is thi s more obvious than in medical ethics. A quick comparison
of the differe nt conclusions already reac hed by secular bioethics and
Roman Catholic medical ethics should make this graphically clear.
Consider for a moment the strikingly different conclusions they
reach. Secular bioethics considers the following as ethical: contraception;
the use of abortifacients; pre natal diagnosis with the intent to abort
defective babies; human embryo and hum an fetal research; abortion;
human cloning ; the formation of human chimeras (cross-breeding with
other species); " brain birth"; "brain death"; purel y experimental high risk
research with the mentall y ill ; e uthanasia ; physic ian-assisted suicide;
living wills doc umenting consent to just about anything; and, withholding
and withdrawing food and hydration as extraordinary means. In contrast,
Roman Catholic medical ethic , as expressed in the National Conference
of Catholic Bishops ' Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health
Care Services I considers all of these unethical - with the possible
exception of the use of "brain death" criteria (and some Catholic
theologians are now becoming concerned about that as well). Probably the
only issues on which they both agree is that the use of extraordinary means,
e.g. , a ventilator, is not morall y required if a treatment is medicall y futile,
and that even high doses of pain medication may be given if medically
appropriate. How is it that these two ethical systems lead to such opposite
and contradictory conclusions,) It is because their conclusions flow
necessarily from very different ethical principles, or premi ses.

A. Secular Bioethics
Secular bioethics is an academic ethical theory that was made up in
1979 by a group called the National Commission, and documented in their
Belmont Report.2 They were attempting to identify " neutral" ethical
principles that could be used in a pluralistic, multi-cultural society - where
no one's ethics should be imposed on others. The Belmont Report
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identified three ethical principles - respect for persons (which rapidly
evolved to mean pure autonomy), justice and beneficence - otherwise
known as "the Georgetown Mantra".3 These principles were supposedly
drawn from the systems of various philosophers - e.g., Kant, John Stuart
Mill , and John Rawls. In effect, they took bits and pieces from different
ethical theories and rolled them up into one ball. Each of these principles
they referred to as primafacie - i.e., no one principle could overrule any of
the others. The way we come to know these ethical principles is by taking
courses, attending conferences, and listening to bioethici sts lecture.
However, eventually and inevitably cracks began to form in the very
foundation of this brand new ethical theory. For example, because
bioethics was derived from bits and pieces of fundamental1y different and
even contradictory theoretical systems, the result was theoretical chaos,
rendering it academically indefensible. More problematic, when people
tried to apply the theory it didn ' t work because practicall y speaking there
was no way to resolve the inherent conflicts among these three principles.
While the Commissioners of the Belmont Report gave a nod to the
traditional Hippocratic understanding of Beneficence as "doing good for
the patient", their definition is essentially and predominantly utilitarian,
with particular emphasis placed in that Report on the "good" for society at
large - or roughly, "the greatest good for the greatest number of people."
Utilitarianism has always had a serious problem with defining in practice
what "good" is, but it is generally reduced to some sort of lack of pain, or
pleasure. It is clear, however, that their formula leaves minorities and the
vulnerable out in the cold. There are no moral absolutes here - only "rules"
or risklbenefit ratios, which are by definition relative. As utilitarian, the
general norm or standard against which one determines if an individual
action is right or wrong is "utility"; i.e., if that action is useful to achieving
good consequences, those being defined as "the greatest good for the
greatest number." The principle of Justice, too, is ultimately defined along
utilitarian lines. Even the principle of Autonomy eventually ends up
serving "the greatest good" - as I will indicate in a moment. At any rate,
after all is said and done, bioethics is reduced to some form of utilitarianism or
relativism, where "consequences" are the only morally relevant condition
and the "good" of the individual person is clearly not top priority.
There are several misconceptions about bioethics I would like to
clarify. First, bioethics is not really just the "general moral consensus of
the people", but rather it is an idiosyncratic systematic academic theory of
ethics alongside many other such academic ethical theories or systems
vying for recognition in the universities - bioethics simply being the one
that was made up by the National Commission. Second, bioethics should
not be equated with the entire field of "ethics" per se, as often seems to be
the implication today, but again, it is only a sub-field of ethics. Third,
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bioethics is not a " neutral" ethical theory at all, but defines itself as
"normative"- i.e. , it takes a stand on what is right or wrong. 4 In fact, there
is no such thing as a " neutral" ethics - and that includes utilitarianism,
consensus ethics, Kantianism , cultural relativism, emotivism, casuistry,
and communitarianism as well.
Eventually, as with most made up theories, bioethics is now in fact
dysfunctional - it doesn ' t work, as admitted in publications by even many
of the founders themselves - the best kept secret in bioethics! For example,
Daniel Callahan (one of the founders of the bioethics "think tank", The
Hastings Center, and former director of the American Eugenics SocietyS)
conceded in the 25th anniversary issue of The Hastings Center Report
celebrating the "birth of bioethics" that the principles of bioethics simply
had not worked . But not to worry, he said, we ' ll try communitarianism
now: "The range of questions that a communitarian bioethics would pose
could keep the field of bioethics well and richly occupied for at least
another 25 years! "6 AI Jonsen, one of the original members of the National
Commi ssion, admitted, in his "Preface" to the ftrst serious book confronting
the myriad inadequacies of " bioethics principlism", that there were really
only two real ethicists on that Commission , that they had essentially made
the principles up, and agrees with the premise of the book that bioethics
should now be regarded somewhat as a sick patient in need of a thorough
diagnosis and prognosis:
A fairly widespread perception exists. both within and without the
bioethics community, that the prevailing U.S. approach to the ethical
problem s rai sed by modern medicine is ailing . Principlism is the
patient. The diagnosis is complex , but many believe that the patient
is seriously, if not terminally, ill. The prognosis is uncertain . Some
observers have proposed a variety of therapies to restore it to health.
Others expect its demise and propose ways to go on without it. 7

Gilbert Meilaender's early and inci sive suspicions about the
consequences of the several "mind/body splits" inherent in bioethics
theory emerged in yet another important book, in which he explains "how
easily the ' soul ' - attention to the meaning of being human, a meaning
often illuminated by religious and metaphysical insight - can be lost in
bioethics."8 Other controversies and battles over the validity of the
bioethics principles on many levels are documented and collected in an
already classic tome edited by Rannan Gillon,9 in which 99 scholars from
around the world jump into the fray.
Equally problematic is the fact that only a very tiny percentage of
" professional bioethics experts" have any academic degrees in bioethics at
all, and even for those few that do there is no uniform or standardized
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cuniculum, most teachers don 't really know the subject matter themselves,
the courses vary from institution to institution, there are no local, state or
national boards of examinations, and no standardized professional
responsibilities are required. There is not even a code of ethics for
bioethicists. Most "bioethicists" by far have never taken even one course
in bioethics. lo
Regardless, these bioethics principles of autonomy, justice and
beneficence were made the explicit basis for many major government
regulations, private sector and industry guidelines, even international
guidelines still in use today - e.g., the federal OPRR regulations on the use
of human subjects in medical research, The Common Rul e, Institutional
Review Board Guidebooks, Hospital Ethics Committee Guidebooks, most
policies for hospitals and other health care facilities, the international
CIOMSIWHO Guidelines for the use of human subjects in Third World
countries, etc. I I The bioethics principles now literally redefined the
"ethics" of other disciplines, e.g., business ethics, and ethics in engineering.
Even our country's military schools have restructured their ethics courses
and essentially reduced them to courses in bioethics. Many colleges and
universities already require a course in bioethics in order to graduate.
More recently, the proposed statute concerning the use of
"decisionally incapacitated" human subjects in medical research, introduced
in the State of Maryland legislature in early March 1999, is grounded on
these same three bioethics principles, as its first drafts explicitly state. This
proposed statute purports to "respect the autonomy" of mentally ill human
subjects to such an extreme that it would allow them to give informed
consent to choose "research agents" who would then "substitute their
judgments as to whether or not these mentally ill persons would have
wanted to participate in even high risk, no direct benefit medical research
for "the greater good of society", were they competent l2 - an absurd and
dangerous interpretation of autonomy and altruism, indeed.
Although bioethics wants to claim that it does not embody any
anthropology - or definition of a "person" - it obviously does. One of the
most popular by far comes from one of bioethics ' most infamous
practitioners. Australian animal rights philosopherlbioethicist Peter Singer,
president of the International Institute of Bioethics under the United
Nations, and the director of Princeton U niversity's Center for Human
Values, defines a "person" as something actively expressing "rational
attributes" (autonomy, choosing, loving, self-consciousness, relating to the
world around one, etc.) and "sentience" (feeling pleasure and pain).
Therefore, he enthusiastically advocates infanticide of even normal healthy
newborn human beings - in fact, even older children. Why ? Because they
do not actively express "rational attributes" or "sentience", and therefore
they may be human beings, but not "persons." On the other hand, he claims
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that the higher primates, e.g., apes, monkeys, dogs, pigs, chickens - even
prawns - are persons because they do actively exercise "rational attributes"
and "sentience" :
... For on any fair comparison of morally relevant characteristics,
like rationality, se lf-consc iousness, awareness , autonomy, pleasure
and pain, and so on, the calf, the pig and the much derided chicken
come out well ahead of the fetus at any stage of pregnancy - which if
we make the comparison with a fetus of less than three months, a fish
or even a prawn would show more signs of consciousness. Since no
fetus is a person. no fetus has the same claim to life as a person. 1.1
... Now it must be admitted that these arguments appl y to the
newborn baby as much as to the fetus. A week-old baby is not a
rational and self-conscious being; and there are many nonhuman
animals whose rationality, se lf-consciousness , awareness, capacity to
feel , and so on , exceed that of a human baby a week, a month, or
even a year old. If the fetus does not have the same claim to life as a
person, it appears that the newborn baby does not either, and the life
of a newborn baby is of less value than the life of a pig, a dog, or a
chimpanzee ... In thinking about thi s matter we should put aside
feelings based on the sma ll. helpless and - sometimes - cute
appearance of human infants. To think that the lives of infant s are of
special value because infants are small and cute is on a par with
thinking that a baby seal, with its soft white fur coat and large rou nd
eyes deserves greater protection than a whale which lacks these
attributes. Nor can the helplessness or the innocence of the infant
homo sapiens be a ground for preferring it to the equally helpless and
innocent fetal homo sapiens. I.

But it if is true that a "person" is defined only in terms of the actual
exercising of "rational attributes" and "sentience", then the following list
of human beings are also not human persons, and therefore not due the
same ethical and legal rights and protections as persons : the mentally ill,
mentally retarded, patients with Alzheimer's or Parkinson 's disease, the
comatose, alcoholics, drug addicts, the frail elderly, paraplegics and all
other disabled human beings, patients with nerve damage or disease, etc.
Philosopherlbioethicist R.G . Frei s correctly pushes Singer's logic to
its inevitable conclusion: the mentally ill, etc., who are not "persons"
should be substitutedfor the higher primates, who are "persons", in purely
destructive experimental research. This is ethical - even morally required
for " the greater good." Similarly, Norman Fost defines cognitively
impaired human beings as "brain dead". Singer, who also enthusiastically
promotes eugenics, uses all three bioethics priiicipies at will, depending on
which one gets him where he wants to go. Thus adroitly he appeals to our
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autonomy - e.g., if the parents of a defective newborn, or even a normal
newborn, autonomously "choose" to kill their child, then that is ethical and
we must respect their autonomous rights. However, if the parents won't do
this on their own accord if it is for "the greater good", then the government
has the duty to force them to do it, particularly if the child is defective! So
much for rights ; in fact, Singer does not even believe in rights at all! 16 His
colleague R.M. Hare is just as articulate when he discusses the role of the
government in such issues. For Hare, the maximum duty that is to be
impo ed by the government is to do the best impartially for all the
"possible people" there might be by having an optimal family planning or
population policy, which means necessarily excluding some possible
people. Indeed, he argues, the best policy will be the one which produces
that set of people, of all "possible sets" of people which will have in sum
the best life, i.e. , the best possible set of future possible people! 17
No wonder Singer has been run out of Gennany, Austria, and France,
and is picketed just about every place he lectures.
At any rate thi s explains in essence what bioethics is, what its ethical
principles are, and why it comes to the conclusions it does in these medical
ethics issues. Given that secular bioethics comes to so many conclusions
opposite from those of Roman Catholic medical ethics, I would suggest
that we reconsider using the term "bioethics" to refer to Roman Catholic
medical ethics. One is definitely not the other.

B. The Moral Law
By contrast, the Church bases its ethical decisions on the moral law and the moral law itself is composed of two basic laws - the natural law, or
what we can know is right or wrong through the aid of reason alone, and
Divine Law as interpreted (not made up) by the Magisterium. 18
The natural law does not mean the "laws of nature" or the "laws of
the Cosmos" - as many New Age gnostic versions of natural law advance,
nor does it refer to the " laws of society", but is grounded instead on the
objective and objectively knowable nature of human beings. It is not
something made up. Because it is based on our common humanity, natural
law transcends different cultures, times, ethnic backgrounds, etc. - and is
therefore truly applicable to all people at all times - including the 21st
century.
Here the common good is not defined as "the greatest good for the
greatest number of people", but rather as those goods which all human
beings, simply as human beings, have in common - e.g., food , water,
shelter, clothing, friendship, etc. Maritain captures the stark difference
between these two concepts of "the common good":
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The end of soc iety is the good of the community. of the soc ial body.
But if the good of the soc ial body is not understood to be a common
good of human persons. just as the soc ial body it e lf is a who le of
human persons, thi s conception also would lead to other en'ors of a
totalitarian type. The common good of the city is neither the mere
collection of private goods, nor the proper good of a whole
which ... relates the parts to itself alone and sacrifices them to itse lf.
It is the good human life of the mu ltitude, of a multitude of persons;
it is their communion in good li ving . It is therefore common to both
the I·vhole and the parts into whi ch it flows back and whi ch, in turn.
must benefit from it. . .. It presupposes the persons and fl ows back
upon them, and, in thi s sense. is ac hi eved in them . . . . It is a
fundamental thesis of Tho mi sm that the person as such is a who le .
The conce pt of part is opposed to that of person. To say. then , that
soc iety is a who le composed of persons is to say that soc iety is a
w hole composed of wholes .... (I)f the person of itself requires "to be
part of ' society, or " to be a member of society", thi s in no wise
means that it mu st be in society in the way in which a part is in a
whole and treated a a whole in soc iety.

As human beings we are always persons.
" Personhood" is
coextensive with human nature. By virtue of possess ing intellect and will,
we are " beings of a rational nature", or " rational animals"- and therefore
by definition we are also persons simply by possessing thi s human nature l 9
- whether we happen to be exercising it or not. Nor is " person" the same
as the common understanding of "personality".20
It is because we are persons who knowingly and willingly choose to
perform certain actions that those actions are called " moral " or " immoral".
Since our human natures always strive toward our human good or
perfection - our "end"- we know empirically that those actions are morally
right which lead us to our natural end, and those actions are morally wrong
which lead us to harm instead, or go against the good of our human nature.
For example, taking crack cocaine is wrong because it harms us, hurts us ,
prevents us from reaching our human ends or goods - not beca use God
said so. A human act, then, derives its moral goodness from its conforrruty
with human nature. And human nature cannot be changed (and still remain
human) .
The first ethical principle of the natural law, from which several
other principles are drawn , is familiar to us all : "Do good and avoid evil."21
Natural law also includes three (not one) general norms against which we
determine what is right or wrong: ( I) the subjecti ve norm - not just
"conscience", but a welljormed conscience; (2) the objecti ve proximate
norm - right reason, a very rich understanding of reaso n whi ch embraces
the harmony, interrelationship and good within any single individual, as
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well as among individual s within a society. Here the "common goods"
must flow back upon the backs of each and every member of that society,
and th e institutions are there to ensure that;22 and (3) the ultimate norm the Divine Nature itself, the ultimate measure of right and wrong, and of
goodness. Of course, the Divine Nature is not the subject matter of natural
law philosophical ethics, but of theology (w hich I will address in a
mo ment).
In applying these general nonns to concrete situations we decide what
particular actions are right or wrong based on three (not one) conditions:
the kind of action, the intention for doing the action; and the circumstances
under which the action is done. All three conditions must be met for an
action to be ethical; and although the intention and the circumstances are
mostl y determinative, there are some - not many, but some - kinds of
actions that are absolutely morally right or wrong. For example, kinds of
act ions such as using human beings in research with the intention of
helping to cure diseases is not inherently wrong, in fact it is laudable, as
long as cel1ain circumstances prevail , e.g., the person has given infonned
consent, and any harm sustained is proportionate to the medical good that
can be derived. However, this does not mean that we can volunteer to
mutilate or otherwise seriously harm ourselves. Nor does it mean that even
earl y human embryos, who are scientifically human beings and therefore
human persons, may be destroyed in order to help others in need. 23 It is
inherently wrong to intentionally kill an innocent human being regardless of the intention or the circumstances - or her size. Evil may not
be done that good may come of itY
Natural law theory may seem at first a bit complicated, but then life
is complicated, isn' t it? So shouldn't the theory reflect thi s reality ? All in
all, this is a very objective, realistic, interrelated, rich ethical theory grounded on our very natures as human, and known deep in the heart of
every human being.25 It is itself a pal1 of the eternal law, which includes
both the physical laws of nature and the moral law.
You mi ght ask, though , if the natural law is naturall y known, why is
it that so many people don't seem to know it, act against it, even deny it?
This is a good question, and does indeed point to the limits of using just the
natural law as a moral guide in the 21st century. Many people have lost
their se nse of the natural law within them by habitually acting against their
true good, by seeki ng only things that feel good, or by succumbing to the
myri ad of temptations constantly sUITounding us that seem good.
Can ethics, then, be built on man alone? If a human act derives its
moral goodness from its conformity with human nature, from where does
human nature get its goodness? To really answer these questions we need
also look further at the other part of the moral law - the Divine Law, as
interpreted by the Magisterium.
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The Divine Law is essentially what we learn through Divine
Revelation , as interpreted by the Magisterium - the Bible, the Word of God
(not, by the way, to be equated with theological theories). We accept it on
faith , and faith of course is a gift. ft is roughly summarized for us in the
Ten Commandments - commandments which are definitely not emblematic
of some dictatorship, but rather are there to help us, to guide our human
actions toward an even highe r good than natural ones - eternal life with
God - our ultimate e nd or GOOD. It is from the Divine Goodness of the
Nature of God Himself that the natural goodness of our own human nature
is de ri ved. And so it is this whole moral law, taken in its entirety, which
grounds th e Church 's position on the li st of medical ethi cs iss ues I
compared earlier.

C. The Choice
Now which of these ethical systems would you choose to guide you
in considering the complicated ethical issues in the 21 st century - many of
which are already here? The choice is yours. Should we enter the 21st
century embracing the relativistic and utilitalian bioethics of the National
Commi ssion - an ethics which in no way really reflects the consensus of
the majority of hum an beings, an ethics which is artificial, nol neutral, is
theoreticall y indefensible and practically unworkable, and therefore
already defunct? An ethics which absolutizes autonomy in the extreme,
but where eventually even autonomy is rendered useless and absorbed into
an absolute utilitarian ethics which abandons the good of the individual
human being and eliminates any good of any minority?26 A theory where
many human beings have less worth than a chicken or even a prawn - and
so therefore they can be kill ed by "choice" or used as " biological
mate ri als" in research to further "the greater good" of perfect people?
Or will you choose an ethics which is objectively grounded on our
very human natures, on what we know empirically is either harmful or
good for us as human beings? One which defines the "common good" as
those goods which we hold in common simply as human beings? A rich
consistent ethics that is cognizant of and matches the complexities of dail y
living in the real world? One grounded on the immutable laws of man 's
nature but which is capable of being drawn to immeasurable heights by its
perfection in the Divine Law, the Word of God?

D. The Individual Members of the John Carroll Society
It is indeed this moral law, I would suggest, which is embodied in the
many good works of the John Carroll Society. How? Well , according to
the moral law, a mong all other creatures, rational creatures (that 's us!) are
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subject to and participate in Divine Providence in a more excellent way (if
they so choose) insofar as they are provident- by trying to take care of, do
good for, themselves and others:
... Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to divine
providence in a more excellent way. in so far as it itself partakes of a
share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for
othersY (emphas is mine)

And in a very special way you, the members of this Society, do precisely
that. Through the kinds of actions such as sharing your gifts, your talents,
your time and efforts, through your gifts of knowledge and medicine and
law and all the other important professions, you have already produced
enormous concrete good for our suffering and vulnerable brothers and
sisters here in Washington. You have knowingly and willingly chosen to
care for the sick, the troubled , the lonely, the forgotten, the abandoned, the
di sabled, the vulnerable (We' re all vulnerable, aren't we?).
By thu s being provident for others you in fact do participate in the
Divine Providence of God. Like Mother Teresa, your actions also help to
fortify us all against our own deep dark unspoken fears of our earthly
mortality, of the incontinence and dependency of aging, of the inevitable
weakening of our bodies and our minds. In our vulnerable sisters and
brothers we see ourselves, and we know that for the grace of God there go
I! You have heard, "seen" through the light of understanding elevated by
faith , and heeded the Word of God , instructing us that "As you did it to one
of the least of these my brethren, you did it to Me ."28 Somehow you
understand that the reason why you do this is, your intentions , are
ultimately because you love God - the ultimate reason for all of our
actions . You know that there is more to life than thi s life!

Conclusion
So which ethics will you choose to guide us through the turbulent 21st
century before us - sec ular bioethics, or the moral law? The choice is yours
- though it might be prudent to remember that it is not just that we have a
choice. Of course we each have a choice or there would be no ethics at all!
The real issue is whether or not that choice is good or bad. A small error in
the choice of an ethics will lead to multiple - indeed- massive harm and
destruction in the 2 I st century - for ourselves, as well as for our culture
and society.29 Choose well, my friends .
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